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FEDERALISM AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
MULTIPLICATION,
DIVISION AND SHARING
By RICHARD J. SCHULTZ*

Canada has a tradition of employing rather straightforward and unsophisticated concepts in distributing responsibilities, regulatory or otherwise,
between the two levels of government. The core concepts have essentially been
geographic or "territorial imperatives" with distinctions between national and
local, intra-provincial and extra-provincial, routinely offered as sufficient
authority to allocate responsibilities. A perfect example of the territorial
catechism took place at the September 1980 conference of First Ministers on
the Constitution when the Prime Minister defended the federal position on
communications, on the grounds of this "clear and simple" principle: "what
goes on within a province should be provincial; what is interprovincial or international should remain federal." 1 For their part, provincial premiers responded
in kind by claiming jurisdiction, for example, over practically the entire telecommunications system because as "local distribution systems" they were
"local undertakings". The premiers even claimed that their jurisdiction included all non-space related aspects of satellite communications.
The logic of the territorial principle can largely be traced to the original
conception in 1867 that "separate yet complimentary" was the ideal to be
strived for as far as relations between the two levels of government were concerned. 2 This can be seen in the attempt to establish exclusive lists of powers
and in the highly exceptional recourse to concurrent jurisdictions. Conflict
soon became characteristic in intergovernmental relations and after World
War II, particularly in the last two decades, rivalry supplanted complemen-

@Copyright, 1982, Richard J. Schultz.
*Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, McGill University. This paper is
based on material from the author's "Partners in a Game Without Masters:
Reconstructing the Telecommunications Regulatory System" in Buchan et al., ed.,
TelecommunicationsRegulation and the Constitution (Montreal: IRPP, 1982). I would
like to thank the participants of the Conference and particularly Rob Prichard
and Michael Trebilcock for their comments and help in preparing this version.
I Can., "Notes for a Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on Communications," in Federal-ProvincialConference of First Ministerson the Constitution,
Document: 800-141039 (Ottawa: Gov't of Can., 1980).
2See Dehem, On the Meaning of "Economic Association" (Montreal: C.D.
Howe Research Inst., 1978) at 15-18 and more generally, Smiley, Canadain Question:
Federalism in the Eighties (3rd ed. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980). For discussions that stress exclusive responsibilities in communications see Dalfen, Constitutional
Jurisdictionover InterprovincialTelephone Rates (1970), 2 Can. Com. L. Rev. 177 and
the sources cited therein.
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tarity as the cornerstone of the relationship between the governments. Today,
rivalry and competition - euphemistically called interdependence - in the
determination of public policies and the provision of public services, dominate
intergovernmental relations. This situation is demonstrated by the routine condemnation of one level of government by the other due to "penetration" or
"intrusion" into its area of jurisdiction. 3 Constitutional concurrency may continue to be exceptional today but defacto concurrency has become the norm.
This article seeks to relate the reality of defacto concurrency to the debate
over allocating regulatory responsibilities for the communications sector.
Discussion shall be limited, however, to telecommunications, and shall not
deal with the other communications sector, broadcasting. In Part I, the existing telecommunications regulatory system will be described. In Part II, there
will be an examination of the principal arguments advanced to justify changing
that system. Three of the major considerations that should be central to any
realignment of responsibilities will be discussed in Part III. And in the final
part, there will be an analysis of the two major competing proposals for
jurisdictional change that have been advanced by the two levels of government; in addition, an alternative proposal will be examined.
I.

THE EXISTING REGULATORY SYSTEM

Despite the prominence attached recently to the territorial principle with
respect to regulation of the telecommunications system, hitherto it has been a
principle much "honoured in the breach". The existing allocation of responsibilities consists of a mlange of jurisdictions that defies characterization and is
devoid of principle. The federal government regulates two companies
operating in three provinces, one company operating on a national basis, one
company providing international telecommunications services, except for
those with the United States, and, finally, the domestic satellite corporation.
Seven provincial governments regulate the telecommunications companies
operating within their boundaries, including services provided on an interprovincial and international basis. Two provincial governments regulate
relatively small telephone companies operating solely within their provinces
and one province regulates virtually no telecommunications at all. The Trans
Canada Telephone System (TCTS), comprised of ten of the twelve major
telecommunications carriers, establishes long distance rates aid services but,
as an entity, is not regulated by anyone. The interprovincial and international
rates and services of the individual members are regulated by their respective
regulatory authorities, federal or provincial. In other words, nine authorities
regulate intra-provincial, interprovincial and international rates and services.
The details of the existing allocations are found in Table I.
3The terms "penetration" and especially "intrusion" entered the argot of Canadian intergovernmental relations with the publication of the Western Premiers' Task
Force on Constitutional Trends, Report of the Western Premiers' Task Force on Constitutional Trends (Victoria: B.C. Min. of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, May
1977). See also id., Report of the Western Premiers' Task Force on Constitutional
Trends, Second Report (Victoria: B.C. Min. of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, April
1978) and id., Report of the Western Premiers' Task Force on ConstitutionalTrends,
ThirdReport(Victoria: B.C. Min. of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, March 1979).
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II.

"IF IT AIN'T BROKEN, WHY FIX IT?"
While it is evident that the "territorial principle" is violated by the existing allocation of regulatory responsibilities, it is, perhaps, of little
significance. Despite the demonstrable lack of administrative and constitutional coherence, there is no serious claim that the telecommunications
regulatory system has adversely affected the provision of telecommunications
services in Canada. Canada has a nationally integrated system that, in terms of
availability, reliability, range of services and costs, is reputed to have few
equals.
TABLE I
PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF CANADIAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY SYSTEM
Company
Regulatory Body
*Alberta Government Telephones
Public Utilities Board, Alberta
*British Columbia Telephone
Canadian Radio-television and
Company
Telecommunications Commission
*Bell Canada
CNCP Telecommunications
*The Island Telephone Company
Limited
*Manitoba Telephone System
*Maritime Telegraph and
Telephone Company Limited
*The New Brunswick Telephone
Company, Limited
*Newfoundland Telephone
Company Limited
*Saskatchewan Telecommunications
Teleglobe
*Telesat Canada

(CRTC)
CRTC
CRTC
Public Utilities Commission of
Prince Edward Island
Public Utilities Board of Manitoba
Province of Nova Scotia Board
of Commissioners of Public
Utilities
Board of Commissioners of Public
Utilities, Province of New
Brunswick
Board of Commissioners of Public
Utilities, Province of
Newfoundland and Labrador
Lieutenant Governor-in-Council
Minister of Communications
Government of Canada
CRTC

*Member of Trans Canada Telephone System

Given the presumed quality of the telecommunications system, it is surely incumbent on those who wish to change the regulatory system to justify such
changes in terms of their impact on the provision of telecommunications services to Canadians.
The response of this article, which does indeed argue for the reordering of
the regulatory system, rests on two basic contentions. First, there is no demonstrable link between the high quality development of the existing telecom-
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munications system and its regulation and second, the opposite may be true in
the future. 4 Both these arguments shall be developed in turn.
Although perhaps overstated, until the last decade or so, regulation, the
regulatory system and government in general were, if not irrelevant, distinctly
secondary influences in the development of the telecommunications system in
Canada.5 Certainly the claimed quality of the system was the product of industry decisions, not public policies. The system developed as it has despite,
not because of, the regulatory system. For example, the principal determinant
of the industry's monopoly structure was neither governmental nor regulatory
but economic in nature. The various regulatory authorities took for granted
the monopolistic structure of Canadian industry because it had largely evolved
before there was extensive regulation. Hence, regulators did not presume that
they could, or even that they should, assume a role in shaping industry structure. In arguing this, of course, it is recognized that once such a structure was
challenged, as it has been in the last decade, regulators could inhibit alternatives by legitimizing and defending the structural status quo. We would
simply observe that prior to this decade the matter was a regulatory non-issue.
Similarly, regulatory authorities played a minimal role in shaping the performance objectives of the industry. In particular, value-of-service pricing and the
system of cross-subsidization involved among classes of users was an industry,
not government, initiative although it came to be subsequently defended on
equitable rather than economic grounds. The cross-subsidization that exists
within the interprovincial toll system serves as an example. When TCTS was
created in 1931, the existing pricing practices were simply extended to include
interregional as well as intra-regional considerations. While never officially endorsed as a matter of public policy, nevertheless, it became a de facto cornerstone of regulatory policy entrenched in the regulatory system.
While past developments in the telecommunications system were industryinspired, it is contended here that the quality of the telecommunications
system may increasingly be linked to the regulatory system. The recent changes
in telecommunications, their implications for the regulatory system and the
consequent political responses will be discussed in developing this argument.
Telecommunications has been characterized by dramatic technological
and economic changes in the past four decades. 6 We are in the midst of
dynamic change of such a magnitude that it may well, as many analysts have
predicted, rival the industrial revolution in its social and economic impact.
Two of the driving forces behind the "information revolution" are the vast
complex of technological developments and innovations in telecommunications carriage involving satellites, fibre optics, lasers, digital transmission and
electronic switching, and the mergence or convergence of communications and
4Although there may be some disagreement over some of the details of and

criteria for this claim, it is widely accepted, most notably by the governments who have
sought changes in the regulatory system.
5See Schultz, Competition as a Trojan Horse (Discussion Paper prepared for
Delta Dialogue Series Seminar No. 19, Toronto, June 23, 1981).
6See, e.g., Serafini and Andrieu, The Information Revolution and its Implicationsfor Canada(Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services, 1981) and Robinson, ed., Communicationsfor Tomorrow (New York: Praeger, 1978).

19821

Federalismand Telecommunications

computers. The latter, which brings together the transformation in carriage
technology with the equally important advances in computer technology and
science, entails the combination of communications functions and information processing.
It is contended here that change as radical and pervasive as that which
telecommunications has undergone, and continues to undergo, is seldom
without its victims. In Canada, as in the United States, one of the first victims
has been the regulatory system. The traditional premises of this system have
been challenged and undermined. Monopoly service, end-to-end service and
value-of-service pricing are no longer tenable although new premises have not
yet won a comparable degree of acceptability. At present there is uncertainty
as analysts and participants attempt to grapple with the new reality.
The changes in the industry have brought on two major sets of conflicts.
The more immediate one pertains to alternatives to traditional telecommunications public policies, that is, endogenouspolicies (policies for telecommunications). 8 Among the more important policies are those which must address the
following issues:
a)
b)
c)
d)

cross-subsidization between monopoly and competitive services;
proper scope for competitive entry;
distributional effects on classes of users; and
effects on innovation and new services.
The resolution of these issues requires fundamental revisions and adjustments
9in political relationships and roles.
In such a process some provinces, such as Saskatchewan and the Atlantic
provinces, will lose some of the financial benefits of the existing system while
others will gain. A redistribution of discretionary decision-making power is
also at stake because the seven provinces now regulating telecommunications
in their jurisdiction may have their discretion constrained while the three
others; Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, may have theirs expanded.
This is perhaps the most intractable adjustment to be made. Given the stakes,
it seems improbable that the provision of telecommunications services can be
isolated or immunized from the ensuing political conflict. The quality of the
telecommunications system is inextricably linked, therefore, to the resolution
of the conflicts over the policies for telecommunications now central to the
regulatory system.
7
Johnson, "Boundaries to Monopoly and Regulation in Modern Telecommunications," in Robinson, id. at 127-29.
8The distinction between policies for and policies using (that is, between endogenous and exogenous policies) is familiar to students of Canadian transportation as
it was central to the Can., Royal Commission on Transportation(MacPhersonReport)
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961). Studnicki-Gizbert has provided a more elaborate
discussion in his Regulatory Policy Optionsin Transport(Toronto: U. of Toronto-York
U. Joint Programme in Transportation, 1971). For an example of its employment and
development in telecommunications, see Porat, "Communication Policy in an Information Society," in Robinson, ed., supra note 6, at 3-60.
9
Although the nature of the regulatory system was shaped primarily by
economic forces, this is not to deny that over time this system came to entail a complex
set of political adjustments and associations.
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Apart from deciding on endogenous policies for telecommunications, exogenous issues (that is, those that address concerns pertaining to the relationships between telecommunications and other sectors of the economy and
society) must also be resolved. These issues involve the use of telecommunica-

tions for the attainment of other objectives in such sectors as banking,
publishing and manufacturing.
These issues have arisen largely, although not exclusively, because of the
emphasis placed by the federal government on the larger role that telecommunications systems can play within society. Telecommunications has, in effect, been given a "governmental embrace" and societal interests have supplanted the traditional individual interests of subscribers and investors as the
dominant governmental concern. This change in emphasis has resulted in part
from the perception, influenced by the technological changes, of the telecommunications system as central to the social and economic infrastructure and,
consequently, as being an instrument for the attainment of a broad range of
public policies. It has also resulted from traditional Canadian concerns about
foreign investment and economic independence. The federal government's
preoccupation with these two aspects in establishing telecommunications

policy was apparent as early as 1973, when, in its first major policy statement,
it stipulated that the objectives of communications policy should be:

a) to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and
economic fabric of Canada;
b) to contribute to the flow and exchange of regional and cultural
information;
c) to reflect Canadian identity and the diversity of Canadian cultural and
social values; and
10
d) to contribute to the development of national unity.
Other policy statements convey the same message." What is particularly
crucial is that underlying the emphasis is, as one study pointed out, a common
set of "anxieties about the vulnerability of Canada to the information revolution." 12 Equally important is the concomitant belief that governmental action
and control must be an integral response to the presumed threat to our
economy and society.
The primacy of federal concerns for the general linkages between telecommunications and other public policy concerns and the specific linking of the information revolution and Canadian sovereignty were made manifest in the
0Min. of Communications, Can., Proposalsfor a CommunicationsPolicy for
Canada(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973) at 3.
11See, e.g., the official statement Gov't. of Cda., Computer
Communications
Policy (Ottawa: Info Cda., 1973), where it is stated that the public policy goal is to en-

sure that computer/communications system evolve "in such a way as to emphasize the
national identity, the achievement of major economic and social aims, both national
and regional, and the maximization of Canadian influences and control over the key ac-

tivities and services." (Id. at 3). For a full listing of other government reports that illustrate this emphasis see Serafini and Andrieu, supranote 6.
12d. at 68.
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13
various versions of the proposed TelecommunicationsAct. This legislation is
the clearest, most authoritative declaration of federal priorities for telecommunications regulation. Section 3, which provides the statement of Canadian
policy objectives for telecommunications, contains eighteen objectives, of
which eight pertain to telecommunications. They are the following:

a) efficient telecommunication systems are essential to the sovereignty and integrity of Canada, and telecommunications services and production resources
should be developed and administered so as to safeguard, enrich and
strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada;
b) the radio frequency spectrum is public property that should be administered in
the public interest and in accordance with international agreements and conventions to which Canada is a party;
c) all Canadians are entitled, subject to technological and economic limitations,
to reliable telecommunication services making the best use of all available
modes, resources and facilities, taking into account regional and provincial
needs and priorities;
d) telecommunication links within and among all parts of Canada should be
strengthened, and Canadian facilities should be used to the greatest extent
feasible for the carriage of telecommunications within Canada and between
Canada and other countries;
h) telecommunications systems and services in Canada... should be effectively
subject to Canadian control through ownership or regulation;
o) the rates charged by telecommunications carriers for telecommunication
facilities and services should be just and reasonable and should not unduly
discriminate against any person or group;
p) innovation and research in all aspects of telecommunication should be promoted in order to improve Canadian telecommunication systems and to
strengthen the Canadian industries engaged in the production of broadcast
programming and the manufacture of telecommunication systems and equipment; [and]
r) the regulation of all aspects of telecommunication in Canada should be flexible
and readily adaptable to cultural, social and economic change and to scientific
and technological advances, and should ensure a proper balance between the
interests of the public at large and the legitimate revenue requirements of the
telecommunications industry.
Given the emphasis on these goals can there be any wonder why the industry is
the "nervous system"! It is also interesting to note that while federal discussion papers refer to some of the issues pertaining to policies for telecommunications, the proposed legislation is virtually silent about the federal
philosophy and approach to the resolution of those issues.
Although the provincial governments have not developed and articulated
their approaches to these issues as extensively as the federal government, they
have indicated that they too have concerns similar to those of the federal gov-

13The first version of the Telecommunications Act was Bill C-43, 1977 (30th
ParI. 2nd Sess.), given first reading in March. The second, Bill C-24, 1978 (30th Parl.
3rd Sess.), was given first reading in January and the third, Bill C-16, 1978 (30th Parl.
4th Sess.) was given first reading in November. All three versions were basically identical.
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ernment. 14 In fact, in many respects, provincial concerns are almost the mirror
image of the federal concerns. Where the federal government emphasizes national development and identity, provincial governments concentrate on provincial or regional development and identity. Where the federal government
focuses on the threats from, and vulnerability to, non-Canadian sources, provincial governments concentrate on similar concerns from other regions and
centres within Canada.
It is the emphasis on the broader exogenous issues, even more than the
conflicts associated with endogenous matters, that underscores the belief that
the quality of telecommunications services will henceforth be inextricably linked to the resolution of conflicts arising from and fought out in the regulatory
system. The endogenous issues involve a relatively narrow, albeit expanding,
set of political relationships. Furthermore, although the stakes, particularly
the redistributional concerns, are not insignificant, they are reasonably well
defined. Consequently the political adjustments involved in the revision of
telecommunications policies would appear to be the more manageable and less
likely to unduly impact the telecommunications system.
Conflicts involving the exogenous goals would appear to pose greater difficulties for several reasons. Such conflicts magnify the stakes involved and, as
a consequence, broaden most significantly the range of interests affected by
decisions. In terms of specific issues, the "governmental embrace" of telecommunications ensures that this sector becomes inextricably embroiled in the
larger arena of federal-provincial relations. Several aspects of this arena are
particularly significant. First, as was indicated earlier, a successful federal attempt to secure a greatly expanded decision-making role in telecommunications would be directly at the expense of the seven provinces that now almost
exclusively regulate telecommunications within their territories. This would
reduce the power of the provinces at a time when they are attempting to expand them. The second aspect of telecommunications becoming bound up in
the federal-provincial relations arena is that the provinces would be losing control to a national government that is widely condemned as being incapable of
adequately representing the regional diversity of Canada. The third aspect is
that unless one level of government secures exclusive control over the telecommunications sector, it seems inevitable, given the track record of the past
decade, that competition and rivalry will ensue not only between the two levels
of government but among the provinces as well, given their divergent interests
and objectives. Such conflicts are often underestimated in this era of provincial "consensus" positions in federal-provincial negotiations. This leads to the
final intergovernmental aspect relevant to the telecommunications sector, the
absence of authoritative and effective decision-making rules to resolve intergovernental conflicts. A decade of constitutional negotiations aptly
demonstrates the absence of such rules. One of the most important consequences of this situation is that individual governments do tend to engage in
unilateralism to further their particular interests.

14 See Schultz, "Partners in a Game Without Masters ... " in Buchan et al.,
Telecommunications Regulation and the Constitution (Montreal: Inst. for Research on
Pub. Pol., 1982).
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In short, the existing telecommunications regulatory system needs to be
revised because it is doubtful that it is capable of successfully coping with, let
alone resolving, the political conflicts it will confront in the eighties.
Technology has eroded both the traditional premises and the associated
political adjustments of the existing system. It is not, however, simply a matter
of establishing new premises and forging new adjustments. In their wake, the
technological forces have significantly multiplied the range of political issues
that the regulatory system is called upon to handle and it is most likely that the
present system will become overloaded. Should this occur, there is the potential for ensuing conflicts to affect telecommunication services in Canada. This
will be the result if the regulatory system is incapable of ameliorating the
federal-provincial and interprovincial conflicts and attenuating the clash of
competing public policies that develop.
Before discussing some of the considerations that should inform any
reordering of regulation, a fundamental objection to the preceding must be addressed. The objection, simply stated, is that the suggested solution of reordering the telecommunications regulatory system is wrongheaded. Technological
forces have not only undermined the traditional regulatory system, they have
called into question the very rationale for regulation of telecommunications.
This position has, most notably, been advanced by Irwin, who has argued that
"the technology genie is out of the bottle, never to return".15 Consequently,
"market dynamics have superceded the need for regulatory protection and industry control . "...16
Regulation should not, therefore, be reorganized but
abolished.
While there is much in this argument to recommend it particularly with
respect to the use of regulation for the pursuit of exogenous goals, there is no
evidence that there will be much political support for it. The depiction by Irwin
of governments as modern-day King Canutes attempting, but failing, to stop
the tides of technology is attractive but not persuasive. It fails to recognize
that, unlike Canute, governments possess more than faith; they are endowed
with resources with which they can attempt to dam and divert the tides. That
they may indeed fail in the long run does not negate the argument that governments specialize in the short run. At a minimum, a concern for reordering the
regulatory system is relevant to a focus on short-run considerations.
III. CRITERIA FOR RESPONSIBILITY DISTRIBUTION
At the outset it was suggested that, hitherto, the core concept for
distributing responsibilities between the two levels of government has been, in
theory if not in practice, the "territorial principle". This principle argues that
the criterion for allocation is the spatial dimension, intra-provincial or extraprovincial, of the activity. Central to this article is the assumption that such a
criterion is of limited utility today if only because governmental responsibilities in the modern state are not easily containable. The decline of complementarity and the growth of competition and rivalry in intergovernmental
15Irwin, Technology and Telecommunications: A Policy Perspectivefor the 80's
(Regulation Reference). Working Paper No. 22 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada,

1981).
16Id.at 75.
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relations reflects the limited value of such a one-dimensional approach to
allocating responsibilities.
In this part three additional criteria that should help to determine the
distribution of responsibilities will be discussed. The criteria are minimizing
regulatory conflicts, maximizing regulatory capacity and ensuring regulatory
representativeness.
A.

Minimizing Regulatory Conflicts
A "concern about the overlapping federal and provincial regulatory
jurisdictions" was one of the major reasons underlying the request from Prime
Minister Trudeau to the Economic Council of Canada to undertake its
"Regulation Reference" 7 While any such burden has been minimal to date,
an explosion of regulatory overlaps and conflicts for the telecommunications
industry is anticipated. Much writing in the past has assumed that an overlap
of responsibilities is harmful and should be avoided.' 8 Recently, some
analysts, particularly those in the "public choice" school, have argued that
such an emphasis is far too simplistic, that monopoly control over the provision of goods and services, or the regulation thereof, is not necessarily
desirable and that duplication and overlap may be conducive to efficiency,
decreased costs and public choice. 19 In short, duplication and overlap are not
necessarily and invariably negative and, by implication, automatically burdening.
Despite these arguments, it is still the case that overlap and duplication in
the regulation of telecommunications is not desirable. This contention rests on
the belief that the public choice view of duplication can be far too sanguine if
those subject to regulatory overlaps have no mobility and hence no "choice".
They must either attempt to satisfy two masters or cease to engage in business
in one of the jurisdictions.
The type of potential regulatory overlap in telecommunications is precisely
that involving one subject and two masters. This overlap may arise because
most telecommunications carriers are involved in both intra-provincial and interprovincial operations; separating the two serves for accounting purposes at
best. Given the differing objectives in the determination of a telecommunications policy, especially those that will develop if governments compete in the
pursuit of wide-ranging goals using telecommunications, the potential
regulatory burden can only be significant. Accordingly, a central criterion for
assessing proposals for allocating responsibilities should be a concern for
minimizing regulatory overlap and conflicts between jurisdictions.

17The complete "Text of the Prime Minister's Letter to the Chairman of the
Economic Council of Canada, July 12, 1978," is found in Appendix A of Economic
Council of Canada, Reforming Regulation (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services,
1981).
18For a useful summary of this literature see Sproule-Jones, An Analysis of
CanadianFederalism, [1974] Publius 107.
19 See, e.g., Landau, Redundancy, Rationality and the Problem of Duplication
and Overlap (1969), 29 Pub. Admin. Rev. 346. Sproule-Jones, Public Choice and
Federalismin Australiaand Canada, Canberra Research Monograph No. 11 (Canberra:
Centre for Research on Federal-Provincial Relations, 1975).
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B.

Maximizing Regulatory Capacity

Earlier reference was made to Irwin's argument that technology had so
radically transformed the telecommunications system that the capacity of
regulation had been completely undermined. 20 While his contention that the
only alternative is the abolition of regulation was noted, his concern for
regulatory capacity must be addressed in any assessment of proposals for
allocating regulatory responsibilities. Irwin points out that "the burden of
regulation is rendered infinitely more complex" with the erosion of traditional
regulatory premises. 21He notes that the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has tried repeatedly to cope with the new regulatory burdens and, in
particular, he cites the effort "to define, delineate and establish market
boundary lines" 22 in order to distinguish for regulatory purposes the areas to
be regulated and those to be left to market forces. "Each attempt", he concludes, "has met with frustration as boundaries refused to remain fixed and
static."23

Similar concerns have been expressed in Canada about regulatory
overload. Janisch, for example, in a recent comment on the Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission's (CRTC) decision on Bell
Canada and British Columbia Telephone's rates for Trans Canada Telephone
System (TCTS) related services noted that the Commission "has set itself a
task whose Herculean proportions it may not have yet fully appreciated." 24 To
support his view Janisch cited the following extract from the decision:
The Commission considers that the aggregate of revenues from TCTS services
should make an appropriate contribution to meet the over-all revenue re-

quirements of the applicants, having regard to the other sources of revenues
available to them, and to the objective of maintaining reasonable levels of local

and intra-company long distance rates. At the same time, the Commission considers that, in the public interest, rates for TCTS services should generally be set

at levels which facilitate the flow of telecommunications across Canada. With
particular reference to those TCTS services which are subject to competition, the
Commission considers that these services should be offered on a compensatory
basis, and that their contribution should be maximized, consistent with demand

and market conditions.25
What must be emphasized is that in their concern for regulatory capacity,
these and other commentators have limited their discussions to the difficulties
posed by the collapse of traditional regulatory approaches and the search for
alternatives. The problems are compounded if governments in Canada attempt to regulate telecommunications for the attainment of a host of public
See text accompanying note 16, supra.
Irwin, supra note 15, at 73.
22
1d. at 64.
23
Id.at 65.
24
Janisch, The CRTC and Consistency: A Comment on the TCTS Decision
(1981), 2 C.R.R. 5-183 at 193. See also his paper with Manley Irwin in this symposium
20
21

in which he refers to regulation as the "overloaded ark".
25 Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. Bell
Canada, British Columbia Telephone -Company and Telesat Canada - Increases and
Decreases in Rates for Services and Facilitiesfurnished on a Canada Wide Basis by
Members of the Trans Canada Telephone System. (1981), 13 CRTC 139, 2 C.R.R.
2-216.
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policy objectives rather than "simply" controlling for monopoly and anticompetitive behaviour.
Although it is impossible to set out here a full statement of the dimensions
of regulatory capacity and how they would be measured, the most salient
aspects can be outlined. Much of the literature on regulatory agency-industry
relationships emphasizes the dominant role that the regulated come to assume
in those relationships. In accounting for industry dominance, insufficient emphasis has been placed on the basic organizational forces at work although
various factors have been identified. 26 The "organizational failures" work of
Williamson and others, however, suggests that the focus be on the central role
of information, the limited number of active participants and the opportunities for holders of information to manipulate its use and exploit it as a vital
28
resource. 27 The result is what Williamson labels "information impactedness".
The extent to which such a state exists is perhaps the fundamental measurement of regulatory capacity. If regulatory capacity is limited and if improving
regulatory performance is the goal, then the means of meeting this goal are by
developing competing centres of expertise and alternative and varied sources
of information. More specifically, multiple decision-makers and segmented
problem-solving or division of labour are possible organizational responses for
enhancing regulatory capacity.
RegulatoryRepresentation
Although not explicitly stated or defended, this article assumes that both
levels of government have legitimate interests which must be respected if there
is to be a mutually satisfactory allocation of responsibilities in the telecommunications sector. An additional assumption is that given the broad range of
resources that participants possess in order to pursue their claims, failure to
devise satisfactory allocation will probably adversely affect the provision of
services.
C.

The federal government's interests derive in part from the "territorial
principle". Inasmuch as Canada has a nationally integrated system, at a
minimum the federal interest is to ensure that there are no provincial barriers
that could fragment that system and to protect against actions by one province
adversely impacting on others. More positively, given the significance that the
telecommunications and larger information systems are assuming within our
society and economy, there is undeniably a legitimate federal interest in the
provision of national telecommunications services. This is not to endorse,
however, the federal selection of regulation as the instrument for the attainment of national goals.

26

See Mitnick, The PoliticalEconomy of Regulation (New York: Columbia U.
Press, 1980) esp. ch. 3 and Quirk, Industry Influence in FederalRegulatory Agencies
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1981).
27
In particular see Williamson, Markets andHierarchies(New York: Free Press,
1975). See also Mitnick, supra note 26, esp. at 206-14 and the sources cited therein and
Argyris, "Ineffective Regulating Processes," in Regulating Business: The Search for an
Optimum (San Francisco: Inst. for Contemporary Studies, 1978).
28 Williamson, supra note 27.
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While the federal government pursues national goals, the provinces have
equally legitimate interests. In terms of the more specific telecommunications
policies, while the provinces cannot invoke claims for "proprietary rights to
the status quo", 29 they can claim some degree of "grandfather rights" to ensure that any changes to the system (over which seven of them have exercised
almost exclusive responsibility from the beginning) are made as equitable and
tolerable as possible. Furthermore, if it is legitimate for the federal government to defend its claim for jurisdiction on the basis of its fears of Canada
becoming an American-dominated "terminal economy", then provincial fears
of an internally biased information system are no less legitimate. The "hewers
of wood, drawers of water" syndrome has long been characterized by its intranational as well as its international variants.
Given the legitimate interests of both levels of government, it is arguable
that there should be "no regulation without representation" .30 In other words,
it is contended that a central criterion for assessing proposals for allocating
responsibilities in a decision-making system must be the degree to which the
legitimate interests of the respective governments are adequately represented.
The concurrency of interests which binds the governments together should be
reflected in a concurrency of responsibility.
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR JURISDICTIONAL
ALLOCATION
Having advanced the case that the existing regulatory system may soon
prove inadequate to the tasks assigned to it and having outlined several basic
criteria that should be used to determine the allocation of jurisdictional
responsibilities, the discussion will now turn to an assessment of three specific
proposals. The first two proposals, which were advanced by the respective
levels of government during the 1980 constitutional negotiations, has been central to the debate thus far; the third is a suggested alternative. The prosposals
shall be outlined and assessed, starting first with the government's proposals.
The federal government in 1980 proposed the following distribution of
responsibilities for the telecommunications sector:
Federal Jurisdiction
a) exclusive responsibility over national and satellite telecommunications
carriers (that is, Teleglobe, Telesat and CNCP);
b) exclusive responsibility over interprovincial and international telecommunications rates and services;
c) exclusive responsibility over unspecified technical standards and interconnection of systems.
IV.

29
The phrase is Tom Couchene's from his excellent Innis Memorial Lecture
Towards a ProtectedSociety: The Politicizationof Economic Life (1980, 13 Can. J. of
Econ. 556 at 558.
30 This principle was apparently first advanced by Stanbury, "The Consumer Interest and the Regulated Industries: Diagnosis and Prescription," in Ruppenthal and
Stanbury, TransportationPolicy: Regulation, Competition, and the Public Interest
(Vancouver, Centre for Transportation Studies, Univ. of British Columbia, 1976) at
139.
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Provincial Jurisdiction
a) exclusive responsiblity over intra-provincial operations of "provincial"
telecommunications carriers including Bell Canada, British Columbia
Tel and Terra Nova Tel;
for "national prob) exclusive responsibility for cable systems except
31
gram" service and non-Canadian programming.
In a subsequently amended vesion of this proposal the federal government suggested that a joint board be established to regulate the interprovincial rates and
services of "provincial carriers". "National carriers" such as CNCP, Telesat
would presumably be regulated exclusively by the federal
and Teleglobe
32
government.
The provincial counter-proposal which was endorsed by all the provincial
governments advocated the following allocation:
Provincial Jurisdiction
a) exclusive jurisdiction over all telecommunications works and undertakings wholly situated within a province;
b) concurrent jurisdiction with provincial paramountcy over all other
telecommunications works and undertakings;
c) exclusive jurisdiction over cable except for broadcast networks extending to four or more provinces.
Federal Jurisdiction
a) concurrent jurisdiction with federal paramountcy over space segment
of communications satellites;
b) concurrent jurisdiction with provincial33 paramountcy over all interprovincial telecommunications carriers.
The provinces' position also stipulated that no provincial or federal law could
disrupt the free flow of information. They proposed an arbitration device "in
the event that the laws of two or more provinces conflict so as to disrupt the
free flow of information" which was that a province could petition the federal
Parliament "to enact a law to resolve the specific conflict".
It is apparent, then, that both governmental proposals epitomize the "territorial principle" in operation. Both would define telecommunications activities and sectors in terms of the territorial dimension and then, largely
although not quite exclusively, compartmentalize governmental authority for
them. The significance is not the difference in their judgment of what is intraprovincial or interprovincial - that is inevitable - but in the implicit agreement that whatever is assigned to one level is of no interest to the other (or at
least of insufficient interest to justify a role for the other). The federal proposal restricts the provinces to a minimal role at the interprovincial level and
significantly restricts (because of traditional relationships between inter and
intra-segments) their discretion at the intra-provincial level by means of
federal control over rates, services and entry at the interprovincial level. The

31 The full text is included in Apps. to Buchan et al., supra note 14.
32
1d.
33Id.
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provincial proposal is perhaps even more extreme in that the federal role
would be even less than that which they are offered in the federal proposal.
This would appear to be valid notwithstanding the provincial proposal for
concurrent jurisdiction over several matters. The operative part of the provincial proposal would appear to be provincial paramountcy. Neither level of
government appears willing to take more than a token acknowledgment of the
legitimate interests of the other. Accordingly, both proposals fail to satisfy this
article's suggested criterion of providing for effective decision-making
representation of the interests of both levels of government.
The proposals do not fare much better in terms of the two other abovementioned criteria. With respect to the concern for minimizing overlap and
potential conflict, the federal proposal would create a two-tier regulatory
system similar to that in the United States; a system which the United States is
moving to abolish because of the conflicts it has entailed, ones which have
become even34 more pronounced because of the development of competition in
key sectors.
The provincial proposal is less problematic insofar as classic two-tier,
federal-provincial regulation is concerned if only because one of the tiers, the
federal one, would be very confined. On the other hand, the provincial proposal is fundamentally flawed on the overlap criterion because it fails to address the issue of conflict resolution where two or more provinces are involved.
Carriers operating in more than one provincial jurisdiction would be subject to
regulation by each of the provinces. Further, the provincial proposal falls to
address, except in the limited case of the free flow of information clause, the
issue of how the demands of the nationally integrated network would be met.
rules or processes for resolving interprovincial
There are no decision-making
35
conflicts and overlaps.
The third criterion, maximizing regulatory capacity, is addressed by
neither proposal. This lack of concern is not surprising. No government can be
expected to show self-doubt. Nevertheless, of the two proposals, the provincial
proposal fares marginally better because it allows for multiple decision-makers
which may, as suggested earlier, 36 enhance the capacity for effective regulation. In view of the comments of Janisch 37 concerning the difficulties faced by
the CRTC in performing within a much more limited range of responsibilities,
it seems inconceivable that the task of regulating the entire field of interprovincial and international telecommunications could be handled by a single
regulator - no matter how large!

In conclusion, although very generalized assessments were offered to support these judgments, it is contended here that neither the federal nor the provincial proposal provides a promising allocation of jurisdictional responsibili34 The most recent Senate Version is found in 127 Cong. Rec. S3544-55 (daily ed.
Apr. 7, 1981)
35For a discussion of this see Schultz, Delegation and Cable Distribution
Systems: A Negative Assessment. Institute Discussion Paper No. 11 (Kingston, Ont.:
Inst. of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's U., 1981).
36 See Part III, B.
37 See text accompanying notes 24 and 25, supra.
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ty. Given that the status quo is increasingly unacceptable, the following alternative is proposed:
Provincial
Jurisdiction over intra-provincial telecommunications works and undertakings including cable systems.
Federal
Jurisdiction over interprovincial telecommunications works and undertakings including cable systems.
On the surface, there is little that distinguishes this from the federal proposal.
The underlying distinction, however, is the institutional system for exercising
responsibilities.
It is proposed that the lines suggested by the federal government in 1980
be followed, but with two significant changes. The first is that federal
regulatory jurisdiction be exercised by a joint federal and provincial agency.
This joint board would regulate interprovincial and international rates and
services, network system interconnection and network-addressing equipment
matters. Thus its mandate would be larger than that proposed by the federal
government, which would have exempted CNCP, Teleglobe and Telesat from
the jurisdiction of the joint board.
The second and more important difference between this joint-board proposal and that of the federal government pertains to membership. The federal
government's position is that it should have a majority on any joint board.
Not surprisingly the provinces, to the extent that they are prepared to even
contemplate such a body, have insisted on the same requirement. One proposal has suggested ten provincial and three federal members. The proposal
advanced here is that the provinces would be given a majority, but only a majority of one. The advantage of such a membership ratio is that the provincial
members collectively would not be in a perpetual minority position while the
federal members would only nominally be so because they would not face insurmountable hurdles in persuading one provincial member to support their
position. The absence of insurmountable hurdles would occur because of the
diversity of provincial interests involved once one goes beyond the initial
political negotiating consensus of the provinces.
In terms of the three suggested criteria, the alternative proposal fares better than the governmental proposals. By providing a mechanism for sharing
responsibility for the most important aspect, interprovincial rates and services,
the "no regulation without representation" criterion is respected. Although
less emphasis appears to have been placed on the overlap criterion, the problems can be overcome by having provincial regulators as the representatives on
the joint board. Thus, while there would be two-tier regulation, the two tiers
would in effect share regulators and this should help ameliorate burdens and
conflicts that result from overlap. Finally, in terms of the regulatory capacity
criterion, the two-tier joint-board alternative would potentially lessen "information impactedness" by providing that multiple decision-makers all address
similar problems. It would do this first by segmenting decision-making along
appropriate functional lines, second by broadening the range of non-regulated
participants who share similar goals and finally by making the resources of
provincial regulatory agencies available through their representatives on the
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joint board. This system whereby both governments divide up some of the
responsibilities while sharing others appears to offer the most potential for
minimizing regulatory organizational failure and thus enhancing regulatory
performance.
V. CONCLUSION
A central contention of this article is that the technological changes that
have fundamentally transformed the telecommunications system have had an
even more profound effect on the telecommunications regulatory system. The
changes have not only undermined traditional regulatory premises and eroded
established political adjustments; they have also changed the nature, and increased the number, of political issues that the regulatory system must address.
In this article some of the primary considerations that should determine the
distribution of regulatory responsibilities between the two levels of government have been analyzed and then related to several alternative distributional
proposals.
In conclusion, it appears that both the current federal and provincial
governmental proposals fail because neither level of government appears willing to make anything more than a token acknowledgment of the legitimate interests of the other. Each is seeking to establish sovereign exclusive rights over
telecommunications. While the specifics of their proposals are in fundamental
conflict, they share a common root and a common imperative: a division of
the telecommunications sector into sovereign parcels of territory.
The parties in conflict would be well advised to re-examine the forces that
gave rise to the need to reorder the regulatory system. Technological change
has brought about a convergence, a sharing, of the traditional roles of communications and computer systems. Economics, driven by technology, has imposed a restructuring and a realignment in the roles and relationships of the
components of the telecommunications system. Carriers, most notably, are no
longer capable of invoking the sovereign prerogatives that once dictated their
relationships with competitors, with users and, indeed, with governments and
their agents. Governments in Canada must realize that they are not immune
from such change. They must accept that there is little place for the cant of
sovereignty. Governments can only aspire to be partners, sharing decisionmaking powers with other governments, carriers and users who now can and
want to make their own choices. If they refuse to share, they may be pushed
aside by both internal and external actors, not to mention technological forces,
and assigned a role as spectator and not as player.

